Thanks, Stacey, and thanks to the organizers for a thought-provoking convention.1 Frightening thought and dialogue are very becoming methods to mark the centenary of the Division of Analysis and Statistics (R&S).
In line with the convention theme, I’ve organized my remarks across the previous, current, and way forward for R&S. My reflection on the previous, whereas idiosyncratic, can be, I imagine, indicative of a by way of line that characterizes the division traditionally. For me, that previous begins in 1983, after I got here to the Board as a newly minted faculty graduate to be a analysis assistant (RA) within the Authorities Finance Part, now often known as Fiscal Evaluation. Certainly one of our major duties was to maintain observe of the unstable, and considerably unpredictable, fluctuations in tax receipts. The each day numbers had been transmitted not by laptop, however by phone. Different knowledge retrieval required RAs to go to the Treasury instantly within the luxurious conveyance of a D.C. taxicab, reimbursed by the Board—just a little perk that, because it occurred, by no means got here my approach. In our part, although, it was plenty of time on the cellphone, and the 2 economists I labored with, Al Teplin and Wolf Ramm, would take down the numbers and cross them to me.
Clearly, many issues have modified in R&S over the previous 40 years. However one factor that hasn’t modified a lot is the position of RAs in analyzing knowledge and collaborating in different vital features carried out by the division. Again then, armed with these tax receipt numbers, I might be anticipated to place collectively a projection. My bosses had their very own projections, in fact, and so they subjected my work to very cautious overview. However I used to be on condition that task as a result of there was a widespread view then that RAs had been right here to study and to contribute meaningfully to analysis and coverage work, and I felt a substantial duty to do the perfect I may with the vital work I had been given. A lot has modified at R&S, however these values stay. As a younger faculty graduate, I used to be impressed with how severely folks in R&S took their obligations, no matter their position. I’m not the one particular person whose expertise as a youngster in R&S was formative. In my case, it may appear outstanding {that a} former R&S RA has returned as Vice Chair, however for many years, former RAs have been returning and serving in management roles on the Board and all through the System.
Shifting from the previous to the current, it has been some time for the reason that issues we thought we understood properly in regards to the financial system had been topic to as a lot debate as they’re immediately. On the similar time, an explosion of obtainable knowledge, a lot of it of excessive frequency and from unconventional or various sources, has given R&S many extra potential avenues for analyzing the financial system and, therefore, far more to do. The checklist of different knowledge sources out there to forecast financial outcomes appears virtually limitless, together with social media posts and internet visitors, bank card purchases, geolocation, and satellite tv for pc imagery. These various knowledge have remodeled the way in which economists forecast future outcomes and measure the effectiveness of financial coverage. For instance, economists can use postings to social media websites to research buyers’, journalists’, and households’ real-time interpretation of central financial institution communications.2 Nonetheless, a wealth of information doesn’t essentially translate into higher forecasts and higher insights. Current tutorial analysis means that various knowledge primarily assist forecast short-term outcomes and never a lot long-term outcomes.3 This is the reason it will be significant that R&S continues to be on the forefront of analysis, ensuring we’re making the precise inferences with new instruments and new knowledge sources.
With respect to the long run, my expectation is that immediately’s challenges will persist. I’ve already talked about one problem, which is to ensure we’re buying the precise “various” knowledge, making the precise inferences, and appropriately utilizing instruments corresponding to synthetic intelligence, together with machine studying, to research this wealth of information. These instruments could also be superb at estimating correlations, however we all know that correlation doesn’t indicate causation; thus, their usefulness could also be restricted. Figuring out a correlation within the knowledge with out figuring out causation could lead policymakers to incorrect conclusions and due to this fact lead us to implement inappropriate insurance policies. As well as, these instruments are superb at knowledge mining, which may be harmful if it offers us the false sense {that a} good in-sample match results in a great out-of-sample forecasting mannequin. Economists in R&S and different divisions, in addition to lecturers, have made progress on this entrance, however there may be room for additional enchancment. Along with the problem of how one can greatest use these instruments and knowledge on the Fed, R&S faces the problem of understanding what these new applied sciences imply for labor productiveness and the financial system.
The opposite problem I wish to spotlight is that of constructing choices beneath uncertainty. This isn’t a brand new problem, in fact. John Maynard Keynes and Frank Knight supplied book-length remedies of the topic a century in the past (Keynes, 1921; Knight, 1921). As well as, in 2003, Alan Greenspan noticed, “Uncertainty is not only an vital characteristic of the financial coverage panorama; it’s the defining attribute of that panorama” (Greenspan, 2003). The truth that uncertainty has been a problem for therefore lengthy makes me suppose that it’s going to proceed be a problem going ahead, and within the wake of the pandemic, it’s extremely salient.
In 1967, William Brainard argued that uncertainty in regards to the energy of financial coverage implied that coverage ought to reply extra cautiously to shocks than could be the case if this uncertainty didn’t exist (Brainard, 1967). Brainard’s attenuation precept is a traditional instance of what has come to be often known as the Bayesian strategy to uncertainty and is usually cited as the inspiration for the gradualism within the adjustment of financial coverage. That stated, strategies based mostly on theories of ambiguity aversion led to anti-attenuation. In different phrases, to guard in opposition to uncertainty, the suitable response could also be a fast and powerful financial coverage response. In fact, the precise response to uncertainty might be context particular and thus varies over time.
As Chair Powell talked about in a speech in 2018, there are two significantly vital instances by which doing too little when there may be excessive uncertainty comes with larger prices than doing an excessive amount of (Powell, 2018). The primary case is when trying to keep away from severely adversarial occasions corresponding to a monetary disaster. On this scenario, phrases like “we’ll do no matter it takes” will probably be more practical than “we’ll take cautious steps.” The second case is when inflation expectations threaten to develop into unanchored. If expectations had been to start to float, the truth or expectation of a weak financial coverage response would exacerbate the issue.4
How to answer uncertainty is a matter that the Federal Open Market Committee, with the assistance of R&S, has been wrestling with for a very long time. Whereas I may very well be improper, as of immediately, I don’t foresee that some omnipotent synthetic intelligence will be capable to completely steadiness the dangers of doing too little or an excessive amount of. Due to this fact, I count on that lengthy into the long run, we’ll be counting on the data and common sense of the folks of R&S to weigh the dangers and to assist in offering choices to financial policymakers in order that they’ll make knowledgeable choices.
In closing, congratulations on a century of service to the Fed and the American folks. I’ve each expectation that the following 100 years of the Division of Analysis and Statistics can be simply as integral to the prosperity and well-being of the American folks because it has been to this point.
Thanks!
References
Brainard, William C. (1967). “Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Coverage,” American Financial Evaluation, vol. 57 (Might), pp. 411–25.
Dessaint, Olivier, Thierry Foucault, and Laurent Fresard (2023). “Does Various Information Enhance Monetary Forecasting? The Horizon Impact,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Greenspan, Alan (2003). “Monetary Policy under Uncertainty,” speech delivered at a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Financial institution of Kansas Metropolis, Jackson Gap, Wyoming (August 29).
Keynes, John Maynard (1921). A Treatise on Chance. London: Macmillan.
Knight, Frank H. (1921). Danger, Uncertainty and Revenue. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Powell, Jerome H. (2018). “Monetary Policy in a Changing Economy,” speech delivered at “Altering Market Construction and Implications for Financial Coverage,” a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Financial institution of Kansas Metropolis, Jackson Gap, Wyoming (August 24).
Schmanski, Bennett, Chiara Scotti, Clara Vega, and Hedi Benamar (2023). “Fed Communication, News, Twitter, and Echo Chambers,” Finance and Economics Dialogue Collection 2023-036. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Might.
Söderstrom, Ulf (2002). “Financial Coverage with Unsure Parameters,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 104 (March), pp. 125–45.
1. The views expressed listed below are my very own and never essentially these of my colleagues on the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
2. For an instance of latest analysis that appears at Twitter posts throughout FOMC days, see Schmanski and others (2023). Return to text
3. Dessaint, Foucault, and Fresard (2023) discover that various knowledge primarily helps forecast short-term outcomes. Return to text
4. For instance, Soderstrom (2002) reveals that when there may be uncertainty in regards to the persistence of inflation, it’s higher to implement financial coverage that’s aggressive than gradual. Return to text